Frequently Asked Questions


About MAPPS

  • MAPPS, short for Mobility Analysis for Pandemic Prevention Strategies, is a research initiative based at the Brown University School of Public Health. MAPPS is funded by a Predictive Intelligence for Pandemic Prevention Phase I (PIPP Phase I) Development Grant awarded by the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Our work focuses on how social mixing and human mobility affect pathogen spread.

  • Predictive Intelligence for Pandemic Prevention (PIPP) is a U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) program that “focuses on fundamental research and capabilities needed to tackle grand challenges in infectious disease pandemics through prediction and prevention.” MAPPS was awarded a PIPP Phase I Development Grant (#2154941) in August 2022.

  • A development grant is a short-term award that funds research planning activities. In the case of PIPP, the Phase I Development Grants are intended to support (1) articulation of critical questions in pandemic predictive intelligence, (2) proposals for novel research or technologies, and (3) formation of multidisciplinary teams.

  • NSF released the PIPP Phase II call for proposals in July 2023.

    PIPP Phase II solicits applications for Center Grants, which will fund seven years of multi-disciplinary pandemic prevention work. This funding opportunity is available to teams that received PIPP Phase I Development Grants as well as those that did not.

  • Infectious diseases naturally follow the movement of people, and each infection in an epidemic is fundamentally the result of an interaction between individuals in the space they occupy. A more refined understanding of these dynamics can help to mitigate future pandemics, allowing us to target behaviors that facilitate disease spread while minimizing restrictions on human mobility.

  • The National Science Foundation (NSF) uses the term “thrust” to refer to a focus area of research activities.

    The four MAPPS thrusts are: (1) database development; (2) wearable device development; (3) modeling for pandemic prevention; and (4) ethics and community engagement. Project activities, particularly those concerned with privacy and ethics, tend to span multiple of these domains.

  • The MAPPS inbox (mapps@brown.edu) is monitored by principal investigator (PI) Mark Lurie and project manager Peyton Luiz. This is the best place to direct general questions.

About MAPPING@Brown

  • MAPPING@Brown is a proof-of-concept pilot project. It takes what we’ve learned from the four thrusts - data, device, modeling, and ethics - and aims to eventually study the entire social network of Brown University.

  • The goal of a proof-of-concept research study is to generate evidence to show an idea or approach works, and is feasible. MAPPING@Brown tests the suitability of using mobile devices to map social networks upon which informative epidemic simulations can be conducted. In other words, MAPPING@Brown is testing the central premise of MAPPS – i.e., that mobility and social mixing data can help us predict and prevent future pandemics.

  • MAPPING@Brown Phase I refers to the feasibility study that took place at the Brown University School of Public Health (SPH) during Fall 2023. The Phase I study utilized a smartphone app to infer participants’ location, movement, and proximity to each other via Low-Energy Bluetooth (BLE) and Wi-Fi.

    MAPPING@Brown Phase I allows our researchers to practice collecting, processing, and utilizing proximity data for infectious disease modeling. The idea is to implement mobile technology in a smaller population (i.e., those who frequent the SPH building at 121 S Main St) before attempting to map the social network of the entire university.

  • The medium-term goal of MAPPING@Brown is to map the entire social network of Brown University and use the data collected to simulate disease spread under different conditions. This campus-wide exercise will take place 2-3 years from now, assuming funding from an NSF Predictive Intelligence for Pandemic Prevention Phase II (PIPP Phase II) Center Grant.

    During PIPP Phase II, MAPPS plans to experiment with different modes of mobility, social mixing, and biometric data collection, including more advanced mobile apps and wearable devices. A key focus of the research in Phase II will be the development of privacy-preserving technologies for collecting and analyzing location data that provides insights into social mixing phenomena without enabling the surveillance of individuals or groups of people.

    On a 5-10 year horizon, we hope to use MAPPS data collection and modeling tools in a variety of settings beyond Brown. Network mapping using mobile devices (e.g., apps, wearables) is particularly promising for conducting research studies in congregate settings, places where people live and work together. Congregate settings include: university campuses; long-term care facilities, such as nursing homes or assisted living centers; dense urban housing, such as high-rise apartments or informal settlements (sometimes referred to as “slums"); penal facilities, such as jails or prisons; and cruise ships.

  • MAPPING@Brown Phase I research activities are funded by a Predictive Intelligence for Pandemic Prevention Phase I (PIPP Phase I) Development Grant (#2154941) awarded by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

What was involved in participating in the MAPPING@Brown study?

Note: These questions are about the Fall 2023 MAPPING@Brown study, a.k.a. MAPPING@Brown Phase I. Data collection for this study has concluded, and enrollment is now closed.

We continue to make this information available as a reference for Fall 2023 participants and those considering enrollment in any future MAPPING@Brown activities.

  • Before enrolling in MAPPING@Brown, participants will be guided through an informed consent process. Informed consent is the foundation of ethical research. It means people are given full information about the study, namely what to expect during participation, so individuals can make a knowledgeable decision about whether entering the study is right for them. In order to enroll in the study, you will be asked to read a consent form which explains the study procedures, benefits and risks, and confirm that you are willing to participate in the study. For more details about the study, its risks and benefits, you are also encouraged to review the information provided in this FAQ and make an informed decision about whether you are comfortable participating.

  • We requested two forms of information from those who chose to enroll in MAPPING@Brown Phase I.

    First, participants were asked to complete a sociodemographic questionnaire. The purpose of collecting sociodemographic information is to explore how infectious disease spreads through different communities, not to police the behavior of those groups.

    Second, participants received a link to download the MAPPS app on your smartphone. The data collection period lasted two weeks, from November 6th - November 17th. During the data collection period, participants were asked to enable scanning in the app while they were in the School of Public Health building at 121 S Main St. The app automatically logged ‘sightings’ of Bluetooth beacons and Wi-Fi access points throughout public spaces in the School of Public Health.

    For more information about how we collect location data via Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, go to the “Data Collection” section below.

  • The time contributions below are estimated from our most recent data collection activity, the Fall 2023 MAPPING@Brown study.

    The informed consent process took approximately 15 minutes.

    Participants could access additional informational resources (such as this FAQ or the project website: https://www.mappsproject.com/mapping-brown) at any time, both before and after you officially decide whether to enroll in the study.

    The demographic questionnaire took approximately 5 minutes to complete.

    Downloading and setting up the app took about 10 minutes. Participants had the option to toggle scanning on and off at any time using the slider in the app. If they chose to deactivate scanning when leaving the School of Public Health, it only took a few seconds to turn it back on.

  • Bluetooth and Wi-Fi data collection through the Smartphone application lasted for 12 consecutive days, from November 6th through November 17th.

  • Before data collection began, participants were asked to complete the sociodemographic survey and download and set up the MAPPS app.

    During the data collection period, we requested that participants keep their smartphone charged and carry it on their person if possible while at 121 S Main St.

  • Participants’ app accounts will be automatically deleted following data collection.

  • The primary risk to MAPPING@Brown participants was loss of confidentiality.

    The location data we collected via Bluetooth and Wi-Fi is linked only to an anonymous “mapping ID” assigned in the app. Even so, location data and movement patterns alone can be quite revealing and could theoretically be used to figure out that a participant is a member of a specific group (e.g., a student group that meets in a certain room at a certain time each week) or possibly to figure out the identity of an individual participant (e.g., the owner of a particular office space). Working backwards to match anonymous data to a person or group is called “re-identification.” Although we take many precautions to protect participants’ privacy (see section on privacy and confidentiality below), the risk of re-identification cannot be entirely mitigated.

    Accidental re-identification may occur when researchers who happen to have contextual knowledge about the study location analyze movement and demographic data from the study. Researchers in this study will never seek to re-identify study participants.

    In the event of a data breach, unauthorized targeted re-identification may occur if malicious agents use the leaked location data and actively cross-reference it with other available data in an attempt to reveal the (probable) identity of specific participants or groups of participants. Overall, the risk of targeted data breaches is low for a small-scale research study, and we have taken precautions to minimize the risk further by separating our datasets and storing the data in secure locations at all times (see section on privacy and confidentiality below) and by limiting the number of persons with full access to the study data.

    There was also a risk that participants could feel uncomfortable when completing the sociodemographic questionnaire (e.g., when describing gender identity, sexual orientation). Survey responses are anonymous (i.e., identified only by a randomly generated “questionnaire ID”), and participants were free to skip any questions they didn’t want to answer.

  • Participants will not directly benefit from participating in this study. However, they could potentially benefit in the future if evidence from MAPPING@Brown helps in the development of secure, user-friendly systems that predict, prevent, and mitigate future pandemics.

  • Participant safety is a top priority of the MAPPS research team, and we’ve worked with experts to make MAPPING@Brown as safe as possible.

    The risk of re-identification increases if a malicious actor has access to multiple anonymous data sets that can be cross-referenced. This is why we store mobility data from the MAPPS app, sociodemographic data from the survey, and a table containing the anonymous IDs linking the two data sets in separate, password protected files on Stronghold. Stronghold is a secure computing and storage environment designed to house sensitive data. You can read more about Stronghold here. Only the PI and a small group of Brown University researchers will ever have access to all participant data on Stronghold.

  • Brown University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has the final say on whether or not a study at Brown meets ethical standards and is safe for participants. An Institutional Review Board (IRB) is a panel that reviews and monitors research involving human subjects. The Brown Office of the Vice President for Research defines the IRB as “a group of people such as scientists, non-scientists, and people from the local community who ensure that human research is ethical.” You can read more about research ethics at Brown here. All MAPPING@Brown Phase I activities that involve human participants were reviewed and approved by the Brown IRB before they were implemented.

  • Participants were not paid for participating in MAPPING@Brown Phase I. As a small thank you for their time and contributions, they had the chance to win a raffle prize. Details about this giveaway were described in the informed consent form.

Data collection

Note: The information provided below is relevant specifically to the Fall 2023 MAPPING@Brown study, a.k.a. MAPPING@Brown Phase I. Data collection for this study has concluded, and enrollment is now closed.

We continue to make this information available as a reference for Fall 2023 participants and those considering enrollment in any future MAPPING@Brown activities.

  • We collected and stored four separate datasets:

    Consent dataset: a dataset containing identifying information (email addresses) for each participant

    Sociodemographic dataset: a dataset which contains responses to a demographic questionnaire

    Location dataset: a dataset containing the location-related data collected through the smartphone app during the mapping exercise

    Linking table: each participant was assigned different anonymous ID numbers for each of these three datasets. The fourth dataset consists of a table which links those ID numbers.

  • In the following, we explain what data is contained in each dataset and why we collected it.

    Consent dataset: this dataset contains participant email addresses and an anonymous ID (“consent-ID”) assigned to each participant. This data is collected from participants’ consent forms. We collected and stored this data for several purposes:

    To document that participants in the study have given informed consent.

    At several points during the study period, we used the email address to contact participants in order to provide instructions for downloading the study app, and to alert participants of the beginning and the conclusion of the location data collection period.

    Finally, we used a participant’s email address to regenerate the anonymous participant ID which is associated with their location data collected by the app (which we call “mapping ID”). This ID was generated using their email address and a cryptographic secret. The same cryptographic secret was used when they registered in the app, thus generating the same ID. We will generate this ID once and will then store it in the linking table where it will be associated with the other anonymous IDs assigned to an individual participant in the demographic questionnaire (“questionnaire ID”) as well as, initially, the “consent ID”. This is what allows us to link a participant’s mobility data and sociodemographic data back to the same person. The “consent ID” will then be removed from the linking table, thus removing any link between the personal identifying information in the consent dataset and the anonymous sociodemographic and location datasets.

    Demographic dataset: this dataset contains participants’ responses to the demographic questionnaire we asked participants to fill in when they enrolled in the study. We collected data about a participant’s age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, education, their position at Brown University, and the number and type (physical, non-physical) of recent social interactions. Each participant was assigned an anonymous, randomly generated ID (“questionnaire ID”) which was also stored and linked with their other anonymous IDs in the linking table to allow researchers to connect the demographic data to the location dataset.

    We collected this data in order to study how social mixing patterns differ between different demographic groups (e.g., undergraduate vs. graduate students). It also helps us understand who might be particularly affected by specific interventions used to stop the spread of disease, so this information is important for contextualizing and informing recommendations derived from the analysis of the location based data.

    Location dataset: this dataset contains data on the ID and location of the Bluetooth beacons and Wi-Fi access points observed by each participant’s phone, and, for each observation, the time when the Bluetooth or Wi-Fi signal was received and the strength of that signal. We also collected data on the overall strength of each Bluetooth signal emitted by the beacons. That allows us to better calibrate your location based on how strong a signal we expect a participant’s smartphone to see for each beacon. We also collected information about environmental factors in specific rooms which affect Bluetooth signal strength, including CO2 concentration, temperature, humidity, and air flow.

    Each participant’s data was assigned an anonymous ID (“mapping ID”) generated by the Smartphone application, using a cryptographic secret and their email address. A participant’s email address is only used once to generate their anonymous ID and is not otherwise stored as part of this dataset.

    The location dataset is the core piece of data collected as part of the MAPPING@Brown study. It allows our researchers to analyze how individuals move through the space in the School of Public Health: how much time they spend in locations with various sizes and characteristics and, importantly, how much time they spend in close proximity to other people in those spaces. This allows our researchers to develop sophisticated mathematical models for simulating how an airborne infectious pathogen (such as the SARS-CoV-2 in the COVID pandemic) might spread and how environmental (e.g., room size and ventilation) and social factors (e.g., length and frequency of contact), as well as targeted interventions would affect the spread of disease.

    Linking table: this dataset contains all the anonymous identifiers associated with individual participants in each of the previous datasets: consent ID, questionnaire ID, mapping ID. At the end of the study period, we delete the consent ID from the mapping table. This removes any explicit links between the anonymous demographic and location datasets and the identifying information we collect as part of the consent process. The linking table is stored separately from the other datasets.

    Using separate identifiers for individual participants in each dataset prevents easy cross-referencing across datasets. Data from the demographic and location datasets can only be linked if the person accessing those datasets also has access to the linking table. This approach of data separation provides some protection against accidental and targeted re-identification and is one way in which we protect your privacy in this study. See below for more information about our approach.

  • We infer your location using Bluetooth beacons and Wi-Fi access points (APs) which are installed on the premises of the School of Public Health at 121 S Main St.

    Bluetooth beacons emit a signal which is picked up by phones in the vicinity of each beacon. The MAPPS study app records the signal strength of the beacons it observes at frequent intervals (every few seconds). If you’re connected to the Brown or Brown-Guest network, the app also records which access point your phone is nearest to and the strength of that connection. Information about the signal strength allows us to estimate your devices’ distance from each beacon and AP.

    We know the location of each beacon and AP. If your phone observes multiple beacons at the same time, we can calculate, by triangulation, an estimate of your location in the building based on your distance from several beacons.

    This also allows us to estimate how many people are in a specific location (such as a seminar room) and how close you are to the people in your immediate vicinity.

  • MAPPING@Brown-specific Bluetooth beacons were only installed on the premises of the School of Public Health. And the MAPPS app is programmed to only record the Wi-Fi access point (AP) the phone is connected to when in range of a MAPPING@Brown Bluetooth beacon. Those beacons and APs were the only method we use for collecting location data. Hence, we could not and did not collect any data outside of 121 S Main St.

Privacy and confidentiality

Note: The information provided below is relevant specifically to the Fall 2023 MAPPING@Brown study, a.k.a. MAPPING@Brown Phase I. Data collection for this study has concluded, and enrollment is now closed.

We continue to make this information available as a reference for Fall 2023 participants and those considering enrollment in any future MAPPING@Brown activities.

  • Consent dataset: We use Qualtrics for the consent process. All data collected as part of that process is initially stored on Qualtrics servers. Once the study period has ended, it will be transferred in an encrypted, password-protected file to FileZilla, a secure transfer server, and finally into a secure storage environment called Stronghold which runs on Brown servers Stronghold is specifically designed to store and protect sensitive study data. All data stored in Qualtrics will then be deleted.

    Demographic dataset: Like for the consent dataset, we use Qualtrics to collect and initially store your demographic data. At the end of the study period, it will be transferred to Stronghold using the same process as for the consent dataset after which all data will be deleted from Qualtrics.

    Location dataset: This data will be collected through the MAPPS app which uses Firestore, a cloud storage platform managed by Google, as a backend. All data collected through the app or with environmental sensors will be sent to Firestore. Once data collection is complete, a study team member will move all the encrypted Bluetooth and Wi-Fi mobility data directly into Stronghold using FileZilla, a secure transfer server. All data stored in Firestore will then be deleted.

    Both Firestore and Qualtrics are approved by Brown for storing sensitive data.

    The concept of siloed collection and storage is visualized above in the data flow diagram.

  • We use secure databases (Qualtrics, Firestore, Stronghold) for storing all study datasets, encrypt them for transfer between databases, and limit access to all study data to a select group of MAPPS researchers who will access the data for study purposes only.

    The main threat to participant privacy comes from the risk of re-identification in case of a data breach. For more information on re-identification, see “What are the risks of participating in this study?” above.

    Here’s what we do in order to minimize the amount of information revealed and thus the risk of re-identification in case of such a data breach: if unauthorized actors gained access to any of the separate datasets we store, questionnaire data or consent data can only be connected with the location data from the mapping exercise if those unauthorized actors gain access to at least two of those data sets and the table linking the separate participant IDs from all data sets. (Links to the consent data which contains participants’ identifying information will be removed once data collection is complete, which further separates this data from the other datasets.)

    While this scenario cannot be ruled out entirely, data breaches would have to affect multiple datasets. The mapping table, specifically, is protected by an additional layer of password protection. This approach of data separation protects against some cases of re-identification. As outlined above, the threat of re-identification increases with each data point that can be tied to a specific individual. Mitigating the risk of unauthorized linking of the location-related mapping data and the demographic data contained in the questionnaire helps lower the risk of re-identification.

    The concept of siloed collection and storage is visualized above in the data flow diagram.

  • Only a small select number of MAPPS staff and researchers will have access to the dataset that contains explicitly identifying information you provide when you sign up for the study, i.e., your email address. All of this data will be deleted 5 years after the end of the study period. In the meantime, staff and researchers with access to that information keep information about your participation confidential. Your decision to participate or not will not be communicated to anyone outside the study, including but not limited to administrators at Brown, and your decision will neither help nor hurt your current role in the School of Public Health.

    That said, location data always carries a risk of accidental or targeted re-identification. (See “What are the risks of participating in this study?” above.) For the steps we take to minimize this risk, see the previous question.

  • No, your data will not be analyzed or used by Google for any purpose. Firestore is a Cloud Service Provider which provides backend infrastructure for a variety of apps and services. It is separate from Google’s main advertising platform and associated free-to-use services (Search, Gmail, Drive, etc.). Under the terms and conditions governing our use of Firebase, data stored in Firebase is only accessed by Google, its employees and contractors if necessary to maintain storage infrastructure and security. In other words, your data will not, under any circumstances, be “mined” by Google as is the case for many other Google services you use.

  • This is a valid concern. One aim of MAPPS is to develop tools for researchers which make it easier to collect and analyze health-related personal data, including contact data. Deploying those tools at large scale could, in the long run, desensitize people to the collection of fine-grained, intimate information about their bodies and their whereabouts. Many of us already engage in this kind of self-quantification (using smartwatches, health apps and other devices). However, every additional piece of surveillance (however valuable and useful its purpose may be) carries the risk of desensitizing us to further demands for data and specifically demands by other, external actors and institutions beyond ourselves and the service providers we choose.

    Habituation of surveillance carries the risk of lowering our resistance to potentially harmful or malicious surveillance efforts over time. From a societal perspective, this is not a desirable outcome: we must remain vigilant and able to critically assess the utility of expansions in data collection and surveillance and weigh it against individuals’ rights to informational self-determination and the harms that come with a loss of privacy.

    In the long run, normalizing surveillance and data tracking also makes it more difficult for more privacy-conscious individuals who do not want their data collected at large scale to resist such efforts. The latter is not the case for the MAPPING@Brown study since participation is strictly voluntary, but we do realize that our study may contribute to an overall environment in which location tracking at educational institutions might become normalized.

    One of the key objectives of the research activities in MAPPs is to figure out how to build tools which allow public health researchers to collect the location- and health-related information that they need while minimizing the collection of directly and indirectly identifiable information. We also want to build study tools which can be deployed in a targeted and time-limited way to study specific populations and communities.

    In this feasibility study of MAPPING@Brown we made a start at integrating privacy preserving principles into the data collection and storage design. The data we collect as part of the pilot study will serve as a basis for exploring the feasibility of implementing more ambitious privacy protecting techniques, such as masking and aggregating specific locations, introducing artificial noise to individual data locally to further spoof individual identities, and further limiting centralized data storage.

  • Even if you decide to be in this study, you can change your mind and stop at any time.

    If you decide to withdraw from the study while data collection is ongoing, you can do so by clicking the “Delete My Data” option in the app menu. You will be able to choose whether you want the study to retain and use any data collected up to that point, or whether you want your app data, or both your app and socio-demographic data to be deleted.

    You can also quit the study by deleting the app from your phone. In that case, all data collected from you up until the point of withdrawal can still be used by the study team for research purposes.

  • Questions about MAPPING@Brown Phase I can be directed to primary investigator (PI) Mark Lurie at mark_lurie@brown.edu.

    If you have concerns related to study ethics and our approach to privacy and data protection, please contact co-PI Julia Netter at julia_netter@brown.edu.